Clouseau Evaluation for Peer-to-Peer Transfer Operations by Antonelli, Charles et al.
  
 
 
 
 
CITI Technical Report 09-01 
 
Clouseau Evaluation for 
Peer-to-Peer Transfer Operations 
 
Charles Antonelli 
Jim Rees 
David Richter 
{cja,rees,richterd}@umich.edu 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We evaluate whether Clouseau, a commercial product from SafeMedia, Inc., is 
effective in discriminating between risky and non-risky P2P operations.  We construct 
a testbed and assess the Clouseau’s efficacy in interdicting risky content while passing 
non-risky content in both laboratory and office settings, using a wide variety of 
applications and protocols.  We determine that Clouseau effectively blocks access to 
content via known P2P protocols communicating with networks identified by 
SafeMedia as containing risky content, but also prevents legitimate communications 
and does not block alternative protocols for accessing risky content.  Consequently, 
Clouseau is not completely effective. 
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1 Introduction 
Peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing networks, implicated in the exchange of copyrighted 
material, are also critical for legitimate file transfers in support of academic research.  We 
evaluate Clouseau1, a commercial product from SafeMedia, Inc. that blocks risky* P2P 
operations, in an experimental test bed.  The goal of this project is to assess whether 
Clouseau is effective in discriminating between risky and non-risky P2P operations. 
We realize at the outset that it is unlikely that a purely technical solution will sort out the 
risky from the non-risky traffic.  Copyrighted content being traded without permission is 
often indistinguishable from content being traded with permission of the copyright 
holder.  Fair use transfers are indistinguishable from those that are not. Cryptography can 
render protocols and content opaque to any filtering device.  Transfers that are legal in 
one jurisdiction may be illegal in another. 
A technical solution must therefore suppress risky traffic based on some evidence that 
historically has been closely associated with risky activity.  Such a solution is necessarily 
less than perfect, as the association of the evidence to the activity is less than perfect, 
with the result that sometimes non-risky traffic will be suppressed or risky traffic will be 
allowed to pass.  Constant monitoring and adjustment of this association, to minimize the 
number of incorrect traffic classifications, must accompany any technical solution.  This 
monitoring and adjustment must occur in both the short term, such as when a faculty 
member needs to transfer a particular file immediately to meet a proposal deadline, and 
over the long term, such as when peer-to-peer software vendors modify their protocols in 
an attempt to bypass detection, or when networks previously known for hosting risky 
traffic present evidence that they have ceased to do so. 
Several technical solutions and vendors occupy this space.  Three types of solutions were 
examined in a recent Common Solutions Group workshop held at Virginia Tech on 
January 9, 2008, where leading vendors of detection and suppression technologies were 
invited to present and discuss the architecture and implementation of their products. 
                                                
* We define “risky” traffic as network data that represents content for which the user 
transferring the data seemingly holds no license or other right to share that content.  
“Non-risky” traffic is network data that represents content for which the user transferring 
the data seemingly holds a license to or has the right to share that content. 
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As summarized in the workshop observations: 
Audible Magic’s CopySense technology can reliably identify only 
material that is registered with the vendor. Moreover, even modest 
encryption enables peer-to-peer traffic to bypass Audible Magic’s 
detection.  
Red Lambda’s cGrid technology detects traffic patterns rather than 
suppresses infringement. It requires considerable administrative expense 
and specific network architecture and management tools to translate 
identification of patterns into suppression of infringement.  
SafeMedia’s Clouseau technology blocks any communications its vendor 
deems undesirable.  Network operators cannot override this blocking 
locally, even if the vendor blocks important non-infringing 
communications or otherwise disrupts network operations and 
effectiveness.2 
This contrasts the strengths and weaknesses of each approach in sifting the evidence: 
direct inspection of the network traffic, which is foiled by encryption; analysis of the 
patterns in the traffic, which depends on accurate analysis of the patterns; and Clouseau’s 
approach. 
The first two approaches suffer from an arms race. Encryption of network traffic will 
prevent direct inspection of it absent the encryption key.  Varying the patterns will 
hamper traffic analysis; for example, network scanners such as nmap3 have been 
successfully evading network intrusion detectors for years by adjusting the timing and 
content of the packets they send.  Certainly the file sharing community will continue to 
participate in this arms race, as evidenced by the recent proposal to extend the BitTorrent 
tracker protocol to obfuscate the peers it returns, to “prevent internet service providers 
and other network administrators from blocking or disrupting BitTorrent traffic 
connections that span between the receiver of a tracker response and any peer IP-port 
appearing in that tracker response4.” 
Clouseau’s approach, which is promoted by SafeMedia as not depending on inspection of 
network traffic or traffic patterns, thus presents an interesting alternative that merits 
closer study. 
2 Testbed 
The CLEPPTO test bed is shown in Figure 1.  A Clouseau filter is installed between a 
network server and a NetGear ProSafe 24 port gigabit switch.  A pair of client PCs 
running Windows XP SP2 and RedHat Linux 2.6.23.1-49.fc8 are connected to the switch.  
The CITI third-floor network, consisting of approximately twenty client hosts using a 
variety of operating systems and P2P clients, is also attached to the Clouseau through the 
switch. The testbed operates at 1 Gbps; some CITI hosts operate at 100 Mbps. 
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Figure 1 
The network server runs RedHat Linux 2.6.23.1-49.fc8 and provides firewalled access to 
the Internet and packet monitoring services. Network monitoring software on the network 
server records traffic that successfully transits the LAN side as well as the WAN side of 
the Clouseau.  The LAN side traffic is obtained via a connection to a monitor port 
configured on the NetGear switch; this connection is shown as a dashed line in Figure 1. 
We used tcpdump5 to collect and store PCAP-format capture files, and Wireshark6 to 
analyze the traffic. 
A client PC running RedHat Linux 2.6.23.1-10.fc7 and sitting upstream of the network 
server is used for some of the tests. 
We attached a laptop running Linux to the Clouseau serial port and used minicom7 2.1 to 
communicate with it.   Once logged in to this serial console, it is possible to ask the 
Clouseau to display a line of information in real time for each packet it drops, or to dump 
this information in bulk to an ftp server on request. 
We installed P2P applications on the client PCs, including BitTorrent and LimeWire, as 
well as applications that are not P2P software but that may exhibit network behavior 
similar to that of P2P traffic, such as NFS. 
3 Testbed Experiments 
A Clouseau 500 was installed in the CITI testbed as shown in Figure 1 on December 5, 
2007.  On December 14 it was replaced with a second Clouseau 500 at SafeMedia’s 
request; this second unit remained installed until the end of the proposed testing period on 
December 21.  The two units had slightly different enclosures but generally exhibited 
similar behavior.  On January 4, 2008 it was replaced with a third Clouseau 500 at 
SafeMedia’s request, containing a fix for a crashing problem we describe in Section 3.6.  
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During the test period we conducted two kinds of experiments.  In the first, we exercised 
various P2P and non-P2P applications on the client PCs, attempting to download and 
upload both risky and non-risky traffic, and measured the performance of the testbed 
components. These experiments are described below. 
The other kind of experiment consisted of CITI staff conducting routine activities using 
their CITI hosts, accessing services at CITI upstream of the Clouseau filter, on the 
University of Michigan’s campus network, and on the Internet.  These results are 
discussed in the next section. 
Both kinds of experiments were conducted concurrently; we monitored network traffic at 
the network server and at the client PCs, and assessed bandwidth usage, network speed, 
and P2P client activity. Data gathered during both of these experiments was used to 
classify network transfer attempts into four classes: 
 
Blocked Risky traffic 
(True Positive) 
Unblocked Risky traffic 
(False Negative) 
Blocked Non-risky traffic 
(False Positive) 
Unblocked Non-risky traffic 
(True Negative) 
 
3.1 Performance 
Throughput and delay are two key performance measures for assessing the impact of any 
network filter.  Accordingly, we used standard tools to obtain these measures with and 
without the Clouseau. 
3.1.1 Setup 
We installed the iperf8 2.0.2 client and server on hosts bess and green.  We used the ping9 
utility to assess packet round-trip time, which we used as a measure of delay. 
3.1.2 Test Procedure 
On an otherwise idle testbed, we started the iperf server on green: 
iperf –s 
An the iperf client on bess: 
iperf –c green 
We measured TCP transfers, and used the tool’s default TCP window sizes of 85 KB on 
the server and 16 KB on the client.  Ten runs were obtained and discarded; the results of 
the next ten runs were averaged.  We used the results obtained by the client. 
We assessed round-trip delay using ping, for the smallest and largest possible single-
packet payload sizes of 56 and 1472 bytes, respectively: 
ping green 
ping –s1472 green 
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Ten runs were obtained and discarded; the results of the next ten runs were averaged. 
We then repeated the iperf tests in the opposite direction, reversing the roles of server and 
client. 
Finally, all tests were repeated with the Clouseau taken out of the testbed, e.g., the 
NetGear switch connected directly to hedy. 
3.1.3 Results 
We report the results as observed by the client; the server results were commensurate.  
For round-trip time, the “server” is the ping destination.  Results are shown in Table 1. 
 
 
Clouseau Server Throughput RTT size RTT 
In green 927 Mbps 56 .486 ms 
In bess 938 Mbps 56 .486 ms 
Out green 941 Mbps 56 .406 ms 
Out bess 943 Mbps 56 .326 ms 
In green - 1472 .688 ms 
In bess - 1472 .694 ms 
Out green - 1472 .548 ms 
Out bess - 1472 .529 ms 
 
Table 1 
 
The Clouseau has a negligible effect on throughput, and introduces a 33%† increase in 
round-trip time for small packets and a 28% increase for large ones.  However, this added 
delay would be negligible between most hosts on the Internet. 
3.2 LimeWire 
LimeWire10 is one of many P2P clients that implements the Gnutella11 protocol and is 
widely used to share risky content. 
                                                
† Setting the green->bess RTT equal to the bess->green RTT of .406 still yields a 20% 
increase. 
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3.2.1 Setup 
We installed LimeWire 4.14.10 on a Mac OS X 10.4.1 CITI host.  It was not possible to 
access www.limewire.com to download the client, so the host was brought out from 
behind the Clouseau in order to download it. 
3.2.2 Test Procedure 
We launched LimeWire and attempted to search for the string “ubuntu”, with the intent 
of locating and downloading a Linux distribution. 
3.2.3 Results 
LimeWire put up a popup window stating that “LimeWire is currently connecting to the 
network.”  The browser status bar displayed “Website found, waiting for reply,” and 
eventually “Can’t display web page.”  No search results were ever returned. 
3.3 BitTorrent 
BitTorrent12 is a file-sharing protocol that distributes the cost of uploading the file to its 
downloaders by requiring that downloaders provide some upload services to other 
downloaders.  BitTorrent is a popular P2P technology for sharing risky as well as non-
risky content. 
3.3.1 Setup 
We installed BitTorrent 4.27.2 on a Mac OS X 10.4.1 CITI host. 
3.3.2 Test Procedure 
From behind the Clouseau, we attempted to find and download an Ubuntu Linux 
distribution using BitTorrent by visiting www.safetorrents.com. 
In a separate test, we placed the Mac on a network that was not protected by the Clouseau, 
launched the BitTorrent application, searched for “ubuntu”, and started a download.  We 
then brought the Mac behind the Clouseau and observed further progress of the download. 
3.3.3 Results 
Visiting www.safetorrents.com allowed us to locate an Ubuntu distribution and download 
it successfully.  On the other hand, once behind the Clouseau we were not able to resume 
a BitTorrent download that had previously been in progress – the download did not 
continue, and no uploads were started.  The SafeMedia Release Notes point out that the 
Clouseau will block transfers from a “contaminated”‡ network. 
3.4 BitTorrent Tracker 
We conducted a BitTorrent test using a University of Michigan server, our own (non-
risky) content, and our own tracker and torrent files. 
                                                
‡ SafeMedia defines a “contaminated” network as one known to SafeMedia to contain 
illegal file sharing content. 
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3.4.1 Setup 
We installed BitTorrent version 4.2.2 on a Linux server running within the University but 
outside the Clouseau protected subnet.  We also installed BitTorrent version 4.4.1 on a 
Mac on the protected subnet. 
3.4.2 Test Procedure 
On the Linux server we started a tracker: 
/usr/bin/bittorrent-tracker --port 6996 --dfile dstate 
then made a torrent of an existing data file: 
-rw-r--r--  1 cja umatlas 18012 Jan 11 12:27 test.torrent 
 
maketorrent-console --data_dir ~ --target \ 
www/test.torrent http://host-dns-name:6996/announce \ 
path-to-file 
and seeded the torrent: 
bittorrent-console --ip host-dns-name --save_as \ 
path-to-file www/test.torrent 
We then copied the torrent file to the Mac and attempted to fetch the data file via 
BitTorrent.  We first did this with the Mac on the outside network to verify that the server 
was set up properly, then moved the Mac to the Clouseau-protected net. 
3.4.3 Results 
With the Mac on the outside net, the BitTorrent fetch succeeded, although somewhat 
slowly at around 17Kbps.  With the Mac on the protected net, the transfer was blocked. 
Following the procedure outlined in the release notes, we asked SafeMedia to unblock 
our torrent server.  They responded within an hour, and said the server would be 
unblocked within three hours. 
After this, the torrent was still blocked.  Again following the release notes, we brought up 
a web server on the torrent server and hosted the torrent file on it using http over SSL 
(HTTPS): 
./shttpd -d /afs/atlas.umich.edu/home/cja/www -p 6990 \ 
 -s /afs/atlas.umich.edu/home/cja/ssl/umfs02.web_server 
Then we fetched the torrent file from the web server, and again tried to fetch the data file.  
This attempt failed.  We then brought up an insecure web server: 
./shttpd -d /afs/atlas.umich.edu/home/cja/www -p 6990 
After re-fetching the torrent file, the file transfer succeeded, at the same rate it 
experienced on the outside net. 
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3.4.4 Discussion 
The Clouseau apparently needs to see the torrent file being fetched from an approved web 
site before it will white-list that torrent.  This makes it impossible to share torrent files in 
a secure way. 
3.5 http 
As we observed several web sites to be unreachable through the Clouseau, we 
investigated both the nature of the blockage and which sites caused this behavior. 
3.5.1 Setup 
We used Web browsers (Safari on Macintosh; Mozilla, Firefox, and Opera on Linux; and 
Chimera on OpenBSD) and command-line tools (nc13, wget14) on various hosts on the 
LAN side of the Clouseau.  We created a script on hedy to manage a pair of tcpdump 
captures on both its NetGear and Clouseau connections during a LAN-side browser 
session; this allowed us to observe differences in the filtered and unfiltered traffic.  We 
also used nc and wget to generate appropriately modified HTTP requests. 
3.5.2 Test Procedure 
We attempted to view web pages using various URLs, some of which were contrived 
while others were accessed by CITI staff in the course of normal operations. 
3.5.3 Results 
The Clouseau passes the three-way TCP handshake, but drops all transmissions of the 
HTTP GET packet from the LAN side.  Consequently, the client sees no data packets 
whatsoever. 
On closer inspection, we found the Clouseau dropped HTTP GET packets that contained 
the header: 
Host: thepiratebay.org 
Capturing the request, modifying this header to 
Host: thepiratebayx.org 
and transmitting the modified request with nc succeeded in transferring the page; wget 
yields a similar result using its –header argument.   Use of a tool such as WebScarab15 
automates much of this analysis.  
The Host: header is optional in HTTP/1.0, and therefore a browser need not supply it; 
Chimera falls into this category.  Comparing an original version of Chimera with one 
modified to include this optional header demonstrated that the absence of the header 
enables the browser to access “contaminated” networks. 
It thus appears that the Clouseau is inspecting HTTP application layer headers inside 
packet bodies, and basing its decision to drop packets on what it finds there.  During our 
investigation, we found the Clouseau blocked access to a surprising collection of web 
sites; see Section 4 for details. 
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3.6 bbftp 
The bbftp16 application is a file transfer tool optimized for bulk data transfer over wide-
area networks, using multiple independent simultaneous data streams.  It is commonly 
used in the scientific community for exchanging large experimental datasets. 
3.6.1 Setup 
We installed version 3.2.0 of bbftp (client) and bbftpd (server) on bess and on pogo, 
another CITI host outside the Clouseau network running Linux RHEL5.  We installed a 
600 MB test file (a Linux distribution .iso file) on both hosts. 
3.6.2 Test Procedure 
We started the bbftp server on bess: 
bbftpd -b -m 10 
and invoked the bbftp client on pogo: 
bbftp -m -p 10 -e "get bigfile" -u user bess 
We used ssh17 to connect to these machines to start the software, with another ssh 
connection to monitor progress.  We varied the number of parallel ftp streams in this test, 
up to a maximum of 10.  We also reversed the roles of bess and pogo. 
3.6.3 Results 
With the first two Clouseaus evaluated, we found that requesting several parallel streams 
would, in a fairly short time, crash the Clouseau entirely.  The machine would reboot 
itself, usually several times in succession, and it would eventually redisplay its login 
prompt.  During this interval it would pass no traffic. It never required more than ten 
successive transfer attempts to trigger this condition. Nothing was output on the 
Clouseau’s serial console during these events. 
To observe this condition with slower traffic, we interposed a 100 Mbps hub between the 
Clouseau and its WAN connection.  In this configuration, we were not able to cause the 
Clouseau to crash, although it slowed down ssh connections passing through it and 
exhibited noticeably irregular delays over them. 
We notified SafeMedia of this condition with our first Clouseau and, while the second 
was also susceptible, the third model appears to have addressed this problem.  With our 
current Clouseau it is not possible to force a crash with bbftp. 
All three Clouseau models sometimes misidentify bbftp traffic as GnuNet§ traffic, and 
block it. 
3.7 tor 
Tor18 is a distributed overlay network designed to anonymize TCP-based applications 
like web browsing, secure shell, and instant messaging. Clients choose a path through the 
                                                
§ “GnuNet” is a P2P protocol that, like bbftp, uses SSL for encryption. 
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network and build a circuit in which each node in the path knows only its predecessor and 
successor nodes. Traffic flows through the network in fixed-size cells, which are 
unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node (like the layers of an onion) and relayed. 
3.7.1 Setup 
We downloaded a Tor & Privoxy & Vidalia bundle (version 0.1.2.18a) from 
torproject.org and installed it on a Mac, outside the Clouseau network, running Mac OS 
10.4.11.  We also installed the Torbutton Firefox extension from addons.mozilla.org. 
3.7.2 Test Procedure 
We started the tor proxy, connected Firefox to it, and verified via packet dumps that it 
was fetching web pages via the tor network.  Then we timed how long it took to fetch 
several web sites: umich.edu, google.com, and torproject.org.  We then moved the Mac 
onto the network protected by the Clouseau and repeated the timings. 
3.7.3 Results 
The Clouseau did not block the tor traffic but slowed it down considerably. The average 
time to load torproject.org went from 10 seconds outside the Clouseau network to 25 
seconds inside.  We examined the packet traces and discovered that Clouseau was 
blocking tor requests to remote servers on port 9030.  The tor client then connected to a 
different set of servers on port 9001 and these connections were not blocked. 
We then published a web page at http://www.citi.umich.edu/tor/server/, on a server 
outside the Clouseau test network, and attempted to connect to it from Firefox running 
inside the test network.  Neither the server nor the client had any tor software installed.  
The Clouseau blocked connections to the server. 
3.8 NFSv4 
NFSv419 is a modern distributed filesystem with strong security.  We use it extensively at 
CITI, with some users accessing their home directories over NFSv4. 
3.8.1 Setup 
For this test, we used bess as the client and mounted NFSv4 exports from the servers 
sparta (a NetApp filer) and whisper (a Linux server); bess was behind the Clouseau and 
the servers were not. 
3.8.2 Test Procedure 
We had bess mount sparta using three different security measures: first, without 
encryption; second, with Kerberos encryption (krb5), where protocol headers are 
transmitted in the clear; and third, with Kerberos encryption and privacy (krb5p), where 
NFS headers are also encrypted. 
In each test, we had bess copy a large file (700MB) from the server.  After running the 
tests with sparta, we repeated the tests using whisper as the server.  Then, to verify that 
the difficulties did not stem from NFSv4 itself, all of the tests were repeated with bess 
outside of the Clouseau. 
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During testing, once the Clouseau had started blocking traffic, we generally restarted it 
before trying another test. 
3.8.3 Results 
Without encryption, while the copy would sometimes work correctly, performing several 
copies in a row or performing other concurrent command-line tasks such as listing or 
changing directories would cause the Clouseau to start blocking traffic.  With krb5 
encryption, the copy nearly always ended up blocked by the Clouseau.  With krb5p 
encryption, interestingly, the copy nearly always worked without being blocked, while 
the transfer was noticeably slower; we are not sure of the connection. 
Whenever the Clouseau blocked NFSv4 traffic, it was misidentified as GnuNet traffic.  
Please refer to Section 4 for more on using NFSv4 in the presence of the Clouseau. 
All of these tests returned correct results when run with bess outside of the Clouseau. 
3.9 Thunder/Gigaget 
Xunlei20 is a popular Windows-based Chinese P2P application in widespread use around 
the world.  It supports multiple protocols and uses P2SP (“peer-to-server-peer”) to 
increase download speeds by sharing content not only between client peers, but also 
between clients and fixed servers.  Because it appears not to rely on the usual P2P 
protocols, Xunlei transfers can appear as normal web traffic. 
Xunlei is entirely in Chinese.  A modified version of it called Thunder also has English-
language support.  Gigaget is an internationalized version of Xunlei that is somewhat 
redesigned and distinct from Thunder. 
3.9.1 Setup 
We downloaded and installed Gigaget and Thunder (with its English-language package) 
on winona, running Windows XP SP2. 
3.9.2 Test Procedure 
Separately, we started each of the clients and attempted to search for and download 
potentially risky content. 
3.9.3 Results 
Thunder was more difficult to use because most of the application’s options and 
searchable content was not in English.  However, browsing through content was possible, 
and most searches returned pictures of things like popular movie posters or album covers, 
and so items could still be identified.  We were able to access risky content in the 
presence of the Clouseau when using Thunder. 
Interestingly, this was not the case with Gigaget.  Despite that it appears to be very 
closely related to Thunder, upon starting Gigaget the Clouseau immediately started 
blocking inbound packets from a server in China and identified the traffic as Xunlei.  The 
Gigaget client never made any progress and was not usable. 
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3.10 Zattoo 
Zattoo21 is an Internet television company that achieves good performance by relying on 
P2P techniques to share streaming content between nearby Zattoo users. 
3.10.1 Setup 
On winona, we downloaded the Zattoo version 3.0.8 beta for Windows and signed up for 
the University of Michigan's IPTV trial, which offers about 10 popular television 
channels to campus users. 
3.10.2 Test Procedure 
Our tests consisted of starting the client and letting television shows run.  We watched for 
jitter and audio problems and switched channels periodically.  For comparison, we also 
tested Zattoo outside of the Clouseau. 
3.10.3 Results 
The Clouseau did not appear to have any negative impact on the Zattoo client.  No traffic 
was ever logged as blocked by the Clouseau and quality did not degrade. 
4 CITI Staff Experience 
The CITI staff experiment began on December 5, 2007, when the Clouseau was installed.  
Approximately 20 staff machines were either directly connected to the the NetGear 
switch as shown in Figure 1, or were connected over a wireless 802.11g Access Point 
which was itself connected to the NetGear switch. 
CITI staff were asked to go about their daily business and report any false positives, i.e. 
legitimate packets the Clouseau was dropping, as well as any false negatives, i.e. P2P 
traffic the Clouseau seemed to let through. 
4.1 True Negatives (unblocked non-risky traffic) 
Here are some of the many web sites we were able to access from behind the Clouseau: 
www.berkeley.edu 
www.umn.edu 
www.google.com 
www.stonesoup.org 
www.sol.de 
www.salineschools.com 
www.umflyers.org (web login required) 
directory.umich.edu (CoSign22 WebISO login required) 
wolverineaccess.umich.edu (Two-Factor Authentication:  CoSign plus token required) 
mfile.umich.edu (with cached credentials) 
www.piratesinfo.com 
ctools.umich.edu 
nationalcity.com 
capitalone.com 
www.chase.com 
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4.2 False Negatives (unblocked risky traffic) 
We copied two different kinds of content from a Mac located behind the Clouseau to 
pogo.  One kind was a small collection of MP3 files representing content for which we 
obtained permission for reproduction from the copyright holder, and the other consisted 
of licensed content (from a DVD of a motion picture) whose copyright had lapsed.   We 
used the scp utility to copy the content through an encrypted tunnel and rcp to perform 
unencrypted transfers.  The Clouseau did not block either of these copy operations. As 
SafeMedia has stated that they perform no content inspection, these were expected results. 
4.3 True Positives (blocked risky traffic) 
The Clouseau drops packets from all of the P2P applications we tested and prevents any 
communication with peer applications on “contaminated” networks on the WAN side of 
the Clouseau, except for Thunder**.   
Access was blocked to websites hosting common P2P programs for download (e.g., 
www.limewire.com), as was access to some websites that can be used to find risky 
content, such as thepiratebay.org. 
4.4 False Positives (blocked non-risky traffic) 
4.4.1 Web sites 
We compiled a short list of inaccessible web sites: 
en.wikipedia.org 
www.bittorrent.com 
www.securityfocus.com 
http://scienceblogs.com/cognitivedaily/ 
www.askdavetaylor.com 
www.alltheweb.com 
legaltorrents.com 
www.ynetnews.com 
del.icio.us 
albion.facebook.com 
After contacting SafeMedia about some of these websites, some became accessible, 
probably via the Clouseau periodic update mechanism, but others remain blocked. 
These apparently innocuous sites include www.ynetnews.com (an English-language 
Israeli news site) or del.icio.us (a popular social-bookmarking site).   
Sometimes sites would fail to load because of something obscure like a banner ad being 
hosted from a “contaminated” domain (e.g., ads.morpheus.com), despite that none of the 
                                                
** It is reasonable to assume that Clouseau can block Thunder in the same manner as it 
currently blocks other P2P protocols. 
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actual content was.  The practice of routinely rotating banner ads obscured the nature of 
the intermittent page-load failures somewhat. 
4.4.2 POP3S 
The Clouseau appears to block access to Google Mail on POP3S port 995 intermittently; 
when this occurs, the Mac OS X Mail application remains stuck in the "sending 
password" state. 
4.4.3 IMAPS 
The Clouseau occasionally blocks access to mail servers on IMAPS port 993; mail-
readers fail to load content.  On these occasions, the Clouseau identifies the traffic as 
belonging to Retroshare, a P2P program that uses SSL.  This happened to four different 
users during the aggregated CITI staff experiment. 
4.4.4 HTTPS 
The Clouseau occasionally blocks access to University of Michigan web-based email, 
which traffic is encrypted with SSL.  Google Chat over SSL is also occasionally blocked; 
when this occurs, the chat client displays “We're experiencing technical difficulties that 
may prevent your chats from being sent.”  Access to a satellite television company's 
support website was also blocked.  On these occasions, the Clouseau identifies the traffic 
as belonging to Retroshare. 
4.4.5 bbftp 
The Clouseau periodically blocks bbftp traffic, which is encrypted with SSL.  On these 
occasions, the Clouseau identifies the traffic as belonging to GnuNet. 
4.5 Clouseau events 
On four separate occasions during the testing period, our Clouseau crashed with the 
symptoms described in Section 3.6.  This happened with our first two units. This 
appeared to be load-related, and the Clouseau seemed more susceptible to crashing if a 
large amount of traffic had recently passed through it.  Shortly before it crashed, it also 
appeared to degrade its performance noticeably, with some connections seemingly 
unaffected while others were disproportionately degraded.  All of these observations were 
subjective, however – it is difficult to see inside a black box. 
After each such event we transferred CITI users back to the unfiltered network while we 
investigated.  We then reconnected the users back to the filtered network.  After the 
fourth event, we terminated the CITI staff experiment on December 13, 2007. 
SafeMedia sent us a third Clouseau 500 on January 4, 2008.  This version was installed, 
and after testing with bbftp, we determined the crashing problem had been fixed.  We 
placed our users behind this Clouseau and performed a final round of user testing, ending 
on January 18, 2008. 
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4.6 Circumventing Clouseau 
SafeMedia's claims regarding the Clouseau primarily center around it blocking P2P 
traffic, and to aid in that pursuit the Clouseau also restricts access to websites offering 
P2P clients for download.  It should be noted, however, that cached content of those 
blocked websites can still be viewed using Google or the Wayback Machine 
(www.archive.org), as well as unblocked “mirrors” of restricted sites. 
However, when it comes to finding and distributing risky content, there are a variety of 
alternatives to traditional P2P software.  Successfully accessing risky content using these 
methods is possible despite the presence of a Clouseau††.  These are viable alternatives to 
P2P for accessing the content that the Clouseau is ultimately aimed at blocking, and a 
technological solution claiming to interdict all risky content must block these avenues as 
well. 
4.6.1 IRC 
IRC (Internet Relay Chat) has some characteristics in common with P2P: it is distributed, 
searchable, and indexed; it is used to share risky content; it is “free”; and it has legitimate 
uses.  IRC appears as a wide variety of online chatrooms (“channels”) where users can 
also search for and download different types of content from automated “bots”.  There 
are many IRC servers, and they can link together so that a given channel is visible to 
users connected to any of a number of different servers. 
To acquire specific content, a user can go to a website that indexes content in IRC 
channels (e.g., www.packetnews.com) and search for a movie or album; the site responds 
with a specific IRC server, a bot's name, and an item number.  To download the content, 
the user then opens almost any modern chat client, signs on to the server, and sends a 
message to the given bot requesting the specific item; the downloading process can also 
be automated.  Considerable content is available, and channels, bots, and servers shift 
frequently to avoid being shut down. 
In testing, we were able to access risky content on IRC in the presence of the Clouseau. 
4.6.2 USENET 
USENET is a large, decentralized discussion system that also allows file transfers.  
USENET is divided into heavily categorized newsgroups, each of which is similar to a 
threaded web forum:  users can view and post messages and files in the newsgroups using 
a newsreader client.  A newsgroup is not limited to a given server; rather, different 
servers each host copies of the content of various newsgroups and users find servers that 
have the newsgroups in which they are interested. 
As with IRC, a user can go to a website that indexes content in USENET newsgroups 
(e.g., binsearch.info) and search for content; the site responds with a list of posts from 
various newsgroups that likely have it.  The user then finds a server hosting that 
                                                
††These may not count as false negatives, depending on one's interpretation of 
SafeMedia's claims. 
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newsgroup, connects, and downloads the content directly.  As with IRC, a lot of risky 
content is available; nevertheless, USENET also has a wide variety of legitimate uses. 
In testing, we were able to access risky content on USENET in the presence of the 
Clouseau. 
4.6.3 The web 
There are many websites that host risky content without the aid of a P2P distribution 
system.  Instead, they often rely on having multiple redundant, geographically distributed 
servers to serve content.  A common approach is to provide tiered services, where rate-
limited downloads are allowed for free and high-speed, unlimited downloads come for a 
subscription price of usually less than $10/month. 
Some sites (e.g., www.rapidshare.com) advertise free backup services but allow clients to 
upload just about anything.  Often the content is automatically indexed and searchable, 
and other clients can download anything stored on the site.  Other sites are specifically 
geared for a particular type of content, such as freetvdown.blogspot.com, which offers a 
large selection of contemporary television episodes.  Both of these sites generate income 
with advertisements and tiered download services. 
While the Clouseau could easily be configured to block access to specific sites like these, 
relatively simple technological solutions present themselves.  For instance, an unblocked, 
innocuous proxy service could be used to gain access to blocked content; coupled with 
SSL, even suspect searches for titles like “Spider-Man 3 download” would be encrypted 
and opaque to the Clouseau.  Much more sophisticated proxy setups are regularly used to 
bypass the Great Firewall of China.  It is conceivable, perhaps even likely, that 
circumvention measures like this would become common if the domain-based access-
controls that the Clouseau employs became more widespread. 
4.7 Living with Clouseau 
On a simple day-to-day basis, our experience with the Clouseau was mixed.  In many 
respects, the Clouseau worked as advertised: it blocked every common P2P client we 
tried and prevented us from downloading most of them with the Clouseau in place.  
Despite the results of Section 3.8, most routine NFSv4 operations appeared to succeed 
without incident. 
However, in some cases it was difficult to attribute observed problems to the Clouseau.  
For instance, an attempt to clone a Git23 repository over NFSv4 failed. It was not clear 
whether expired credentials, NFSv4, or Clouseau was responsible.  After checking for 
“usual suspects” like expired security credentials or errors in NFSv4 itself, the problem 
remained unsolved.  Even with the knowledge that the Clouseau was in place, it took 
some time before anyone suspected that it might have been the cause. 
This type of difficulty with identifying intermittent problems came back time and again, 
precisely because they were difficult to reproduce.  Since most of the time NFSv4 
seemed to live harmoniously with the Clouseau, it did not immediately seem likely that 
any problems would arise.  This pattern repeated with things like secure web traffic: most 
of the time attempts to access things like webmail or online bank accounts would succeed, 
but sometimes users would be blocked entirely.  In fact, nearly every SSL-related 
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problem was intermittent, including IMAPS, POP3S, HTTPS, LDAPS, and bbftp.  This 
behavior is probably due to the Clouseau’s ongoing traffic analysis. 
As touched on in Section 4.4.1, the issue of blocked websites is a source of confusion.  
Generally when a webpage fails to load, it is because of a slow server, network partition, 
bad cable, or missing browser plug-in.  Sometimes it took a while before the Clouseau 
came under suspicion, either because the websites were utterly innocuous but were 
somehow identified as “contaminated,” or because of something like an advertisement 
from a prohibited domain causing an otherwise-accessible page to fail to load. 
5 Summary 
The Clouseau performs some functions as advertised – it drops packets from all of the 
P2P applications we tested and prevents any communication with peer applications on 
“contaminated” networks on the WAN side of the Clouseau, except for Thunder.  It does 
not interfere with network communications using a number of legitimate, non-P2P 
protocols. With respect to performance, the Clouseau has a negligible impact on 
throughput and round-trip time. 
In this evaluation we have contrived some unlikely scenarios in an attempt to explore the 
boundaries at which Clouseau will block packets.  We believe this is a legitimate exercise, 
as deployment problems will become apparent at these boundaries. 
As Clouseau does not depend on content inspection, it is not vulnerable to being blinded 
by encryption, and it is reasonable to expect Clouseau to continue to perform as P2P 
networks migrate to encrypted traffic.  Clouseau is dependent on periodic updates of its 
fingerprinting information, to allow it to interdict new protocols. 
However, Clouseau suffers false positives: 
• It prevents HTTP traffic to web sites SafeMedia deems inappropriate.  SafeMedia 
did allow access via their update mechanism to some of the sites we reported as 
inaccessible during the test, but others remain blocked. 
• It intermittently interferes with the NFSv4 protocol. 
• It intermittently interferes with several types of SSL-based traffic. 
• It drops any HTTP request that begins with "GET /tor/server/", even when the 
URL refers to a regular web page and not a tor proxy. 
And false negatives: 
• Clouseau does not block several viable alternatives to P2P for accessing risky 
content. 
Finally, with respect to privacy, Clouseau appears to be inspecting application-level 
packet headers. 
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6 Conclusion 
The goal of this project was to assess whether Clouseau is effective in discriminating 
between risky and non-risky P2P operations. 
Clouseau is effective at blocking access to content using known P2P protocols 
communicating with networks identified by SafeMedia as containing risky content.  In 
achieving this result, Clouseau also prevents some legitimate communications and does 
not block several alternative methods for accessing risky content, as summarized in 
Section 5.  Consequently, Clouseau is not completely effective at discriminating between 
risky and non-risky P2P operations. 
It is therefore vital for any institution contemplating the use of Clouseau to be able to 
adjust the way the evidence is interpreted.  SafeMedia provides a procedure whereby 
customers may ask that a particular BitTorrent publisher be unblocked.  This procedure 
has several problems.  First, it requires a correct diagnosis of the problem.  Packet 
blocking by Clouseau is nearly indistinguishable from other kinds of network outages 
such as bad interfaces, switches, or cables, routing problems, network congestion, and 
other sources of packet loss in the Internet. Second, it requires manual intervention and 
can take up to three hours after the request has been made.  Finally, while the user can 
request BitTorrent unblocking, the filtering device ultimately remains under the control 
of SafeMedia. 
In those environments where suppressing risky traffic is of paramount importance, and 
where suffering some amount of “collateral damage” in the form of false positives and 
negatives and unblocking delays can be tolerated, Clouseau can be an effective solution. 
In other environments, including our own, where false positives block legitimate access 
to resources and false negatives can expose users to risk, Clouseau is less effective.  
Organizations wishing to use this – or any other – technology will thus need to decide for 
themselves where in the spectrum between universal risk and universal access they wish 
to be.  
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SafeMedia appreciates the in-depth testing analysis the University of Michigan conducted and 
offers the following observations. 
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The goal of the project as defined by the University of Michigan was to assess whether Clouseau 
is effective in discriminating between risky and non-risky P2P operations.  
 
The scope of SafeMedia’s “Clouseau” P2P active denial system is firmly founded within a 
deeper scientific foundation. SafeMedia actively detects and prohibits P2P protocols, which 
cause “Inadvertent file sharing”. For perspicuity, “Inadvertent file sharing” will automatically 
cause legal exposures, increases security threats to individual and network users and waste’s 
network resources and bandwidth.  
 
Based on this interpretation, Clouseau successfully achieved the tasks of protecting a user’s 
network.  But, other factors play into the real functionality and protection topic.  
 
1. We uniquely deny only P2P protocols, which are used as digital content delivery 
systems and create inadvertent file sharing . That would automatically exclude all 
other P2P applications such as voice over IP, Ruckus, Lionshare, etc. Those P2P 
applications do not create inadvertent file sharing. 
2. Applications like Email, FTP, and IM are not impacted by Clouseau.   
 
We agree with your reports conclusion that Clouseau’s P2P active denial system does exactly 
what it was intended to do which is: “Deny P2P connectivity for P2P clients that allow 
inadvertent files sharing”.  
 
We understand that some P2P clients claim they do not cause inadvertent file sharing and that the 
user can disable uploads.  Unfortunately after exhaustive examination of their programs, the 
users cannot disable uploads if they expect to receive downloads.  So without allowing sharing, 
the program becomes useless. 
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1. Clouseau’s release notes clearly outline that downloading bit Torrent files must be 
accomplished in the same session that the torrent was downloaded.  Resuming a 
download is not allowed since it can inadvertently download “risky” torrent files. This 
was a design criteria for Clouseau and it appears your report validated its functionality. 
 
2. Clouseau’s design is to look at P2Pclient actions. It was never designed to stop command 
line actions. SafeMedia’s entire focus was on the massive and unmanageable use of P2P 
clients. Admittedly, using command line functions for massive transfers are rare and 
would only provide a one-way file transfer.  We chose to not include command line 
transfers because they have almost no impact in light of the volume of massive 
worldwide P2P traffic. 
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1. bbftp does not follow the standard RFC in packet handling and acknowledge your 
awareness of it.  
2. You tested 1GB transmission on a Clouseau configured for 500 Mb capacities.  Once you 
deployed a Clouseau 1000 for the 1gb network, all issues of performance and failure 
stopped. Properly sizing Clouseau deployments involves several network topology 
considerations.  Our technical team is well versed in sizing and can eliminate the under 
sizing that you noticed in your testing. 
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Thank you for discovering this deficiency. Release 1.0.34 corrected this problem. 
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Thank you for pointing out this deficiency. Release 1.0.35 corrected this problem. 
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1. Thunder: release 1.033 corrected this problem and now Thunder is blocked. 
2. In reality Thunder differs from Gigaget and Xunlie in two separate areas: the handshake 
and the pier fetch. 
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Clouseau looks only at P2P clients and will not stop an SCP utility to copy the content through 
an encrypted tunnel. The SCP utility (not P2P) was not in the design criteria of Clouseau. 
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We have tested and documented via Pcap file that Clouseau will not block any mail applications.  
Clouseau is capable of blocking or not blocking, but occasional blocking is more than likely a 
local issue typically generated by issues with a local machine and its internal configuration.  We 
do not see this as a problem that Clouseau can create.  
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Thank you for discovering this deficiency; it has been corrected in release 1.0.33 
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These applications were not part of Clouseau’sspecification. We do not block them. 
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1. Intermittent problems: We have spent a great deal of time testing SSL and NFSv4 and 
could not find any intermittent problems. One suggestion to help quantify the problem is 
to analyze the Clint machine Pcap files against the rejected packets logs from Clouseau. 
After completing this analysis, we found no false positive evidence from either SSL or 
NFSv4. Whenever an intermittent situation occurs and the packets already successfully 
passed through Clouseau, then the problem can be isolated to the client machine. 
2. Although your testing efforts were extensive, some of your testing included scenarios 
that Clouseau was never designed for.  Our solution was designed to work with only 
P2P networks that deliver digital content and create risky inadvertent file-sharing 
environments. If someone wishes to distribute “copyrighted” content, other alternatives 
like mail, ftp, irc, and command line exist which Clouseau will not block.  Premeditated 
file pirates can find alternative distribution methods, but one fact is certain, putting 
Clouseau on a network will totally eliminated a user’s ability to use P2P networks.  
3. Clouseau does not block several viable alternatives to P2P for accessing risky content. 
Viable alternatives or P2P file-sharing work arounds do exist.  Clouseau was designed to 
address the larger problem of file sharing. The facts are 99% of P2P infringe file transfers 
use P2P networks   
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As of release 1.0.49 SafeMedia offers the following features: 
 
1. The user can now selectively define which protocols should be blocked and which 
protocols will remain unblocked.  Both block and unblocked protocols will be reported in 
the system log files. 
2. An automatic redirection feature was added to allow for communicating dropped packets 
in real-time to either an email server, or web serverso the user can be alerted about an 
infringing activity that was performed from his machine. Additionally, and IVR or Voice 
activated file can be created in real time for the call centers alerting them that a user was 
engaged with an infringing activity, eliminating the need of speaking to a customer 
service representative. 
3. Network administrators can change the frequency and timing of updates received, to meet 
the schedules of standard network operation parameters. 
4. Network administrators can request an immediate update without having to wait for the 
scheduled update timeline. 
5. Network administrator’s can define specific date and time settings for regular shutdown 
to match regular shutdown schedules of the network. 
6. Network administrators can defined an IP for remote FTP or Syslog to transfer Clouseau 
logs to a central location for further analyses. 
7. For organizations that acknowledge a P2P problem exists but decide to take no active 
denial actions, the network adminstrator can setup Clouseau to monitor and report 
without dropping any packets.  This would allow complete detection of over (650) P2P 
clients, encrypted or non-encrypted and then notification based on the organizations 
policy around “copyright” infringement. 
 
 
 
